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We analyzed strategies for the use of stockpiled anti-
viral drugs in the context of a future influenza pandemic
and estimated cost-benefit ratios. Current stockpiling of
oseltamivir appears to be cost-saving to the economy
under several treatment strategies, including therapeutic
treatment of patients and postexposure prophylactic treat-
ment of patients’ close contacts.
T
he widespread epidemic of highly pathogenic avian
influenza that emerged in east Asia continues today. As
the epidemic grows, so does the probability that this viru-
lent virus will acquire genetic traits for increased person-
to-person transmissibility, potentially setting the stage for
the next global influenza pandemic (1). 
The next pandemic will be associated with major
adverse health and economic outcomes, with estimated
costs reaching US$166 billion in the United States alone
(2). The World Health Organization recently encouraged
health authorities to consider stockpiling antiviral drugs in
anticipation of a pandemic (3). However, the cost-benefit
of stockpiling has yet to be assessed, and the optimal strat-
egy for antiviral use is still under debate. The Israeli
Ministry of Health appointed a working group to address
national preparation for an influenza pandemic. We set out
to identify strategies for the use of the antiviral drug
oseltamivir in the containment of a pandemic and to con-
struct a mathematical model to appraise the cost and bene-
fit of each strategy in terms of health-related and economic
outcomes.
The Study
We estimated the health-related impact of pandemic
influenza on the Israeli population, by using rates (illness,
physician visits, hospitalizations, and deaths) derived from
previous pandemics, according to Meltzer et al. (2). Costs
related to these outcomes were calculated from data pro-
vided by a major Israeli healthcare organization (4) and by
the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (5). We calculated
direct costs to the healthcare system and overall costs to
the economy, the latter including the value of lost work-
days but not the potential value of lost lives. Point esti-
mates of variables used in the base-case model are detailed
in Table 1 and online Appendix 1 (available from http://
www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol11no08/04-1156_app1.htm). 
According to base-case assumptions, a pandemic would
result in an estimated 1,618,200 patients (≈25% of the
Israeli population), 781,921 physician visits, 10,334 hospi-
talizations, 2,855 deaths, and 6,536,240 lost workdays.
These outcomes would result in an excess of $55.4 million
in health-related costs and in overall costs to the economy
of $523.5 million (≈0.5% of the Israeli gross domestic
product).
We defined 3 strategies for the use of antiviral drugs
during a pandemic: therapeutic use, long-term preexposure
prophylaxis, and short-term postexposure prophylaxis for
close contacts of influenza patients (with index patients
under treatment). The first 2 strategies could target either
the entire population or only those at high risk for compli-
cations. The efficacy of therapeutic treatment was based on
currently available evidence regarding epidemic influenza
(online Appendix 1). Systematic review and meta-analysis
were used to estimate the efficacy of preexposure prophy-
laxis, while the expected efficacy of postexposure prophy-
laxis and the number of persons treated under this strategy
were estimated by using the results of a recently published
stochastic simulation model (6). 
The impact of each strategy on health-related outcomes
was analyzed in a spreadsheet model by using the formulas
summarized in online Appendix 2 (available from http://
www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol11no08/04-1156_ app2.htm).
Briefly, the economic benefit of each strategy was calculat-
ed by multiplying each of the reductions in adverse out-
comes by its estimated economic value. The cost of each
strategy was calculated by multiplying the estimated num-
ber of treated persons by the discounted cost of a single
antiviral course. Oseltamivir was selected as the drug of
choice, at a daily dosage of 75 mg for prophylaxis and
150 mg for treatment (7). Oseltamivir stockpiling costs
were calculated with prices quoted in March 2004 by the
manufacturer’s representative in Israel for uncapsulated,
water-soluble, bulk active powder with a 10-year shelf life.
We compared the economic outcomes of each of the 5
strategies with nonintervention, estimated stockpiling
costs, and calculated cost-benefit ratios. Based on the his-
toric incidence of 3 influenza pandemics over the last cen-
tury, we adjusted all cost-benefit outcomes for a
conservatively estimated probability of 3 pandemics every
100 years and applied a wide range of estimates for sensi-
tivity analyses (online Appendix 1). Table 2 details the
cost-benefit ratios of the competing strategies. Therapeutic
treatment and postexposure prophylaxis were shown to be
cost-saving, with a cost-benefit ratio of 2.44–3.68.
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strain remain unknown, our modeling methods and param-
eter estimates were designed to consistently underestimate
intervention-related benefits, thus yielding minimum esti-
mates of the true cost-benefit ratios. In a series of multi-
variate sensitivity analyses that used the variable ranges
detailed in Table 1, the model proved to be robust. Even
under the most unfavorable estimates, prepandemic stock-
piling remained cost-saving as long as the estimated prob-
ability of a pandemic remained >1 every 80 years. No
consistent advantage to either therapeutic or short-term
prophylactic use of antiviral drugs could be determined. 
Conclusions
In light of recent episodes of human infection with
avian influenza, the World Health Organization reiterated
its 1997 call for all countries to prepare for the next
“inevitable, and possibly imminent” pandemic (3). Strain-
specific vaccine, the most effective tool for influenza con-
trol, will most likely not be available in the early stages of
a pandemic because of its prolonged development time (3),
and early control measures will have to employ alternative
options, mainly the judicious use of antiviral drugs. These
drugs are likely to be in short supply if not preemptively
stockpiled (3). Compared with neuraminidase inhibitors,
the M2-inhibitor drugs have several major disadvantages,
mainly high rates of viral resistance (as shown in recent
H5N1 and H9N2 isolates) and adverse effects (8). 
Our model suggests that prepandemic stockpiling of
oseltamivir is cost-saving to the economy over a wide
range of treatment strategies. Stockpiling is also directly
cost-saving to the healthcare system, if oseltamivir use is
limited to treating patients at high risk. Investment in
stockpiling remains cost-saving to the economy as long as
the estimated annual pandemic risk remains >1 pandemic
every 80 years. In the last 400 years, at least 31 pandemics
have been recorded (8), so that regardless of recent events
in Southeast Asia, present investments in antiviral agents
can be expected to yield a substantial economic return of
>$3.68 per $1 invested, while saving many lives.
This favorable cost-benefit ratio can be achieved if
stockpiled antiviral drugs are administered either solely as
a therapeutic measure or as short-term prophylaxis for
exposed contacts, a strategy termed “ring prophylaxis” (9)
or “targeted prophylaxis” (6). Only 1 study published to
date (6) used dynamic mathematical modeling to examine
the expected effectiveness of this latter control measure on
the population level; that study suggested that this strategy
may significantly reduce illness and death. This epidemio-
logically directed short-term prophylaxis of close contacts
may require antiviral stockpiles considerably larger than
necessary for therapeutically treating patients, but our
model suggests that this investment may still prove cost-
saving, providing that the outbreak dissemination patterns
and population attributes correlate with those assumed by
Longini et al. (online Appendix 1).
When one considers a ring prophylaxis strategy, the
risk of “strategy failure” due to early antiviral stockpile
depletion must be considered. If postexposure prophylaxis
does not confer sufficient immunity upon exposed contacts
who underwent prophylaxis, and if vaccines or additional
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tion of available stocks may leave the population vulnera-
ble to additional outbreak waves, potentially caused by
influx of new cases. The probabilities of similar “failure”
scenarios are difficult to assess and were not included in
our analysis. Application of this strategy for the entire pop-
ulation without surplus antiviral reserves should therefore
be considered cautiously and monitored closely.
This study aimed to elicit minimum cost-benefit esti-
mates for investment in a national antiviral stockpile.
Among our conservative assumptions, we chose to exclude
indirect costs of preventable deaths, which, if added,
would have increased cost-benefit ratios up to 6-fold
(online Appendix 1). Furthermore, in view of recent events
in east Asia, the probability of a pandemic has probably
risen to >3 per 100 years, and new strains may prove more
pathogenic than previous pandemic strains. In modeling
the benefits of therapeutic strategies, we omitted the bene-
ficial effects of decreased viral shedding afforded by neu-
raminidase inhibitors (7), such as a lower secondary attack
rates among untreated contacts. We also ignored the possi-
bility that a fully implemented prophylactic strategy might
achieve full containment of the outbreak (probability esti-
mated at ≈6% for 7-day postexposure ring prophylaxis (6),
dependent on several factors such as compliance, delay in
treatment initiation, and basic reproductive number (6,10).
Finally, as witnessed during the epidemic of severe acute
respiratory syndrome (SARS), the economic consequences
of a rapidly disseminating disease extend well beyond
direct costs to the healthcare system and lost workdays.
Canada had losses >$1 billion during the SARS epidemic,
although the disease directly affected <500 patients (11).
From an economic viewpoint, mitigating a pandemic could
prevent extensive indirect economic losses.
The conclusions of this study must be considered care-
fully during the planning of antiviral stockpiling. Drug
prices can be expected to change substantially as a result
of contractual negotiations with manufacturers (although
our results indicate stockpiling may remain cost-saving
even if drug costs are more than tripled, as would be the
case if preprepared capsules are purchased). Powder-form
antiviral drugs have considerable advantages in terms of
cost and shelf life, but the logistical aspects of their prepa-
ration and distribution should be further assessed to con-
firm feasibility. Finally, we assumed that strain-specific
vaccine would not be available in sufficient quantities dur-
ing the first stages of the pandemic. Efforts are currently
being directed towards shortening this delay. Once avail-
able, strain-specific vaccines would likely be the favored
intervention, with antiviral agents serving as adjunct treat-
ment.
In summary, prepandemic stockpiling of antiviral drugs
can be expected to prove cost-saving. Cost-beneficial
strategies for their use may involve treatment of patients,
and, if backed by adequate antiviral stockpiles, short-term
postexposure prophylaxis of close contacts. These strate-
gies should be considered when planning stockpiling
efforts. 
Several countries have already begun active stockpiling
efforts (12), sufficient in some cases to allow antiviral
treatment of up to 25% of the population (13). We believe
that antiviral stockpiling should be considered a prudent
investment that may help mitigate this impending global
threat.
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